Gulf Economic Normalisation: A Gateway to Regional Domination
By Abdulla Janahi, published at Sifr on 17 June 2025. Translated by Noha AbuShammala
After the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the normalisation agreement with Israel in mid-September 2020, Gulf media platforms were filled with statements from officials of both countries claiming that the “Abraham Accords” [Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel] serve the Palestinian cause. Some even went so far as to assert that this event was conditional upon halting settlement activities in the West Bank. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quickly nullified that claim by approving the construction of thousands of settlement units, while Internal Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir continued directing settlers to commit further assaults against Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Jerusalem, and to devise daily schemes of violence against Palestinians inside the 1948 territories.
Since 2020, in the years following the signing of the “Abraham Accords”, Israel has managed to make diplomatic inroads, which have been gradually paved over the past three decades, including unannounced visits, participation in conferences, backdoor meetings, and the signing of under-the-table deals.
Normalisation with Bahrain: misleading promises of prosperity
The announcement issued in Washington between Bahrain’s Foreign Minister and the Israeli Prime Minister at the moment of signing the agreement stated that the Kingdom of Bahrain and the “State of Israel” are confident that this agreement “will help achieve a future where all peoples and religions can live together in a spirit of cooperation and enjoy peace and prosperity, as countries focus on mutual interests and building a better future”.
The announcement referred to the conclusion of agreements involving investment, tourism, direct flights, security, telecommunications, technology, energy, healthcare, culture, the environment, and other mutually beneficial areas, in addition to agreeing on the mutual opening of embassies. This opened the door to trade exchanges between Israel and both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, despite the widespread popular sentiments in most Arab countries, which reject normalisation policies and have called for a diplomatic, political, and economic boycott of Israel.
In a research paper titled “The Consequences of the New Normalisation Agreements on the Palestinian Cause and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)”, Bahraini researcher Radhi Al-Mousawi points out that the relationship between Israel and the Bahraini Government has not seen significant development economically when compared to the volume of trade between the UAE and Israel. [The Gulf Cooperation Council is a regional alliance formed in 1981 by six member countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.] In 2021 and 2022, the trade volume between the UAE and Israel reached approximately [USD] $2.5 billion, while the exchange between Bahrain and Israel did not exceed $20 million (approximately 7.56 million Bahraini Dinars). It is worth noting that, according to the Bahrain Open Data Portal, its total trade balance for 2024 was around 2008 million dinars, meaning that Bahrain–Israel trade constituted only about 0.3%, while the total value of goods imports was approximately 5872 million dinars and the total value of exports was around 3864 million dinars. In the tourism sector, one million Israeli tourists visited the UAE while only a few thousand visited Bahrain, and in 2022 around 1400 tourists from the UAE visited Israel compared to 400 tourists from Bahrain.
Normalisation with the UAE: bilateral agreements and strategic agenda
Unlike Bahrain, Israel focuses on the UAE due to its oil wealth and tangible successes in economic, commercial, real estate, and tourism sectors particularly in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Al-Mousawi notes in his paper that the UAE’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al-Otaiba, stated in a seminar commemorating three years of normalisation that his country had signed 120 memoranda of understanding with the entity in just three years, and that there are 152 weekly flights between the two countries. Yet, Al-Otaiba retracted and walked back from a previous assertion, saying: “Our agreement regarding normalization in exchange for halting annexation was limited to a specific time frame which has now ended, and we do not have the same leverage we had at the time of signing. The situation is difficult now, and I believe the responsibility lies with the states that will normalize in the future.” He indicated that the value of bilateral trade between the UAE and Israel has “reached $3 billion, and it is expected to reach $10 billion.” The ambassador did not specify a timeframe for reaching this ceiling.
Notably, the agreement signed in Washington on 15 September 2020 between the UAE and Israel stipulated that the two parties would conclude bilateral agreements in the following fields: “healthcare, science and technology, peaceful uses of outer space, tourism, culture, sports, energy, the environment, education, maritime arrangements, communications and postal services, agriculture, food security, water, and legal cooperation”. The two parties may also conclude agreements in other areas of mutual interest, including “finance and investment, civil aviation, visas and consular services, innovation, trade, and economic relations”. The agreement includes an important clause: Clause Seven under the title “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East”. This states that both parties expressed readiness to join the United States in developing and launching a “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East” aimed at expanding diplomatic and commercial relations, stability in the region, and other forms of regional cooperation.
Commercial growth with Israel amid genocide
The “Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics” published data and figures regarding trade between the entity and five officially normalising Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain. The “Arabic Post” website prepared a detailed report analysing this data , which included the following findings.
First, the trade volume between normalising Arab countries and Israel reached approximately $6.14 billion during the period from October 2023 to February 2025, with the value of Arab exports to Israel amounting to about $4.57 billion, while the value of imports from Israel to Arab countries was $1.57 billion. Data analysis shows that the trade volume between normalising Arab countries and Israel during the first 14 months of the war on Gaza increased by about half a billion dollars (12%) compared to the same months in 2022 and 2023.
Second, the top categories of goods exported by the five Arab countries to Israel were pearls, precious stones, precious metals, and imitation jewellery worth $584.8 million—mainly from the UAE; followed by machinery and electrical equipment at $278.5 million; and cement, gypsum, and lime products at approximately $246.3 million. Other key exports included food products, clothing, chemicals, and fertilisers, with the value of Arab exports of fertilisers to Israel amounting to about $52.6 million.
Third, data analysis based on the volume of trade between the five countries and Israel shows that the UAE exported about 1377 types of products and imported around 763 types, with a trade volume of $2 billion. Meanwhile, Bahrain exported 65 types of products and imported 53 types, with a trade volume of $13.6 million.
Comparative observations on the capabilities and economic feasibility of normalisation
Researcher Al-Mousawi draws a comparison between the capabilities of Israel and those of Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Prior to the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Israel had hoped to conclude an agreement with Riyadh, and it was clear that the normalisation train was speeding ahead before being halted by the brutal Israeli aggression in Gaza and the West Bank.
Israel’s GDP reached around $488.5 billion at the end of 2022, according to the World Bank, compared to approximately $45 billion for Bahrain and $600 billion for the UAE, according to official Government of Dubai estimates. Therefore, Israel assigns great importance to the UAE, viewing it as a hub for launching trade with the rest of the world. However, Israel’s economic ambitions are not limited to the UAE, but include all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
Israel’s GDP represents about 24.4% of the GCC’s GDP, which was estimated at $2 trillion in 2022 according to the World Bank. The GCC economy itself represents 63.2% of the combined Arab countries’ GDP. Israeli institutions are seeking to gain a foothold in Arab economies through normalisation and the expansion of exports to the region. The Israeli Ministry of Defense in particular aims to increase military exports to GCC countries, building on a 15% rise from June 2021 and reaching $8.3 billion. At that time, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz expressed confidence that “Israel has new markets and great opportunities for development that will inject billions into the local economy, create new job opportunities, and enhance Israel’s security”, alluding to Gulf markets that have opened some of their doors to the entity’s goods and military equipment.
There are strategic long-term risks for GCC governments if they become even partially dependent on Israeli security. Al-Mousawi emphasises that Israel “exploited the available opportunities amid the Gulf and Arab confusion, accelerating the push for normalisation and pushing to sign numerous agreements in various fields”. This makes sense in light of comments made by Zionist investor and co-founder of the UAE-Israel Business Council, Dorian Barak, who told the Jerusalem Post:
The UAE is a unique platform for reaching the entire world … Israelis are always looking for ways to conduct business in South Asia, East Africa, India, and Bangladesh … which offer markets of two billion people that cannot be accessed from Tel Aviv. But the UAE is where everyone gathers to do business and Israel has finally been accepted into this club. There are many significant equity investors in the UAE, and it is only a matter of time before we see more Emirati companies acquiring large stakes in our companies.
Likewise, Deputy Mayor of Occupied Jerusalem Fleur Nahoum stated that the first year of normalisation with the UAE was “very successful” despite many challenges, foremost among them the COVID-19 pandemic.
Points of attraction and exploitation
Israel is preoccupied with its strategic goals and its ambition to be at the centre of leadership in the Arab homeland. In particular, it seeks to become an industrial producer and net exporter of manufactured goods while relegating Arab countries to the role of consumer as well as supplier of both trade revenue and cheap labour. In effect, Israel aims to transform them into regional peripheries in its “New Middle East” Project, as theorised in the titular book by former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Relatedly, the GCC countries serve as the primary source of financing due to their immense oil and financial wealth, and the focus of Israel and the United States on the GCC countries is based on the well-documented demographic and economic value of a region that is considered to be one of the richest in the Middle East and, indeed, the world.
The Gulf economy has long attracted investors and migrant labour, ranking highly on a global scale. As already noted, the GDP of the six GCC countries exceeds $2 trillion, with Saudi Arabia alone contributing $1 trillion, followed by the UAE with about $600 billion, Kuwait with $184.56 billion, Qatar with $180 billion, Oman with $114.67 billion, and Bahrain with $45 billion. The intra-trade volume among the GCC’s countries is about $127 billion in 2022, led by the UAE at 53% and followed by Saudi Arabia at 26%. This may explain Israel’s specific focus on the UAE.
In terms of oil production, GCC countries produce approximately 17.2 million barrels per day, representing 22.8% of global production, with Saudi Arabia accounting for about 57% of the total GCC output, averaging 9.81 million barrels per day and a capacity exceeding 12 million. Meanwhile, the total value of GCC sovereign wealth funds has reached $4 trillion. These figures present an extremely enticing opportunity for Israel to extract hundreds of billions of dollars through deals centered on technology, espionage, weaponry, and tourism.
The path of Arab normalisation: from promotion to rush
For three decades prior to the signing of the “Abraham Accords”, the Zionist entity worked to achieve normalisation breakthroughs with Gulf countries, especially those exhibiting demographic and population imbalances where citizens constitute only a small minority, such as the case with the UAE and Qatar. This process began to surface publicly in 1994, when an Israeli diplomatic delegation led by then Environment Minister Yossi Sarid visited Bahrain to participate in an environmental conference. Two years later, in 1996, both Qatar and Oman opened trade offices for Israel in their capitals.
In subsequent years, these breakthroughs increased in both frequency and publicity with research centres hosting “experts” and with “popular delegations” being used to promote normalisation and monitor public sentiment. This then evolved into official public meetings at international conferences, often accompanied by bilateral meetings away from media coverage. Normalisation steps subsequently included the recruitment of various organisations, sports delegations, and high profile individuals—including journalists, media figures, and religious leaders from various sects—to conduct visits to occupied Palestine under the banner of tolerance and friendship. The normalisation snowball continued rolling until mid-September 2020 when a ceremony was held on the White House lawn to sign what became known as the “Abraham Accords”, announcing an agreement between the entity and both the UAE and Bahrain, followed a month later by an agreement with Sudan and then Morocco. At that time, Benjamin Netanyahu declared that normalisation would continue with other Arab countries.
The Zionist infiltration of two Gulf countries has since created fertile ground for expansion into other Gulf and Arab countries, which is what the entity seeks in its effort to form a regional alliance against Iran and establish the Zionist dream based on the “New Middle East”. Israel has made significant strides in achieving full normalisation with the countries that signed the Abraham Accords, while also opening avenues in other Gulf states. This includes access to airspace, establishing informal commercial relations, and maintaining ongoing communications, all of which enhance the steps towards full and formal normalisation through diplomatic missions and the establishment of economic, trade, and security relations.
After normalising relations with Abu Dhabi and Manama, Israel has turned its attention to the Gulf financial markets. It specifically aims to purchase shares in companies that it deems to have strategic value for expanding normalisation and making the latter impossible to reverse. Israel’s current focus is on normalising with the largest Gulf country and Arab economic and financial power, Saudi Arabia—the largest oil producer and custodian of the two holy mosques—which is considered the key to normalisation with the rest of the Arab and Islamic world. In addition, the Israeli approach towards the Gulf can also be understood as a process of breaking the normalisation barrier by exploiting these countries’ demographic imbalances and their weak civil societies and structures of political representation.
The Zionist penetration into the Gulf Cooperation Council
Data and indicators of trade exchange between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain clearly signal that this economic relationship does not achieve qualitative or even relative added value. Trade with Israel does not rescue Bahrain from the financial and economic crises it is experiencing. According to official statistics from Bahrain, government debt from bonds and treasury bills rose from 14.4 billion dinars in 2021 to 15.6 billion dinars in June 2024, reaching 22 billion dinars in the budget for the years 2025–26.
Normalisation will not produce tangible revenue increases commensurate with the geopolitical setbacks and the decline in local public support, nor will it outweigh diminishing Arab and global sympathy towards the governments that seek to normalise with the historical enemy of the Arab nation. At an economic level, Israel’s strategy is not aimed at a relationship of mutual exchange but rather a relationship of, first, security and military dominance and, second, economic and political dominance, with the goal of establishing long-term bridges for achieving its strategic objectives. Even if the normalising Gulf governments argue that security and military cooperation are in their favour, such benefits are short term and will evaporate once the regional conflict is settled in Israel’s favour, which is a scenario that would have adverse consequences for all Arab governments, regardless of whether they embark on normalisation or not.
The free peoples of the world have become certain that this entity, a historical artifice of Western imperialism, has become an obstacle and a burden on the capitalist countries supporting it, and the Israeli government is fully aware of the implications of this. Therefore, it works to tighten its grip on the Arab region to consolidate its hegemony. Dr. Marwan Abdul Aal emphasised this idea in his paper “Normalisation of the Century: From Domination to Zionization”, arguing that the portrayal of normalisation as a path to development is a Zionist lie. It is essential to remember what former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban once said: “Israel wants its relationship with Arab countries to mirror the U.S. relationship with Latin America,” meaning that as Israel transforms into an imperial power, it needs its own “Latin America”. Abdul Aal further noted that those attracted to the “economic temptation” thesis, exemplified in the Manama workshop on investment and prosperity in 2019 [held by the U.S. and called “Peace to Prosperity, The Economic Plan: A New Vision for The Palestinian People”], should recall the false promises of “Camp David” and “Oslo” to transform Egypt and Gaza into the Singapore of the East.
Abdul Aal noted that the outcome of the “economic peace” policy as a strategic option is “a form of dependency and dominance that U.S. imperialism relied upon to tighten its grip on Arab countries and consolidate the Zionist entity as an imperialist power with dependencies and appendages in the ruling Arab regimes”. He concludes in his paper that
normalisation is an American insurance policy for the Zionist entity as it faces new involuntary retreats and geopolitical shifts unfavourable to it alongside strategic changes affecting Israel’s ability to fulfil its role: to perform a regional imperial function by incorporating Arab regimes into the Zionist project. This is based on the principle of solidifying the entity’s existence, role, and leadership in the region, which requires establishing normalisation as a shield with security, investment, financial, military, political, cultural, and religious dimensions, and which cements its acceptance at the cost of the Palestinian cause and expropriation of the region’s identity, belonging, and future.